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Abstract-The Analytic Hierarchy Process is used to show how forecasts can be made of the effects of 
monetarist, Keynesian and supply-side macroeconomic policies and to determine their impact on important 
variables such as unemployment, inflation and GNP growth. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The economy is often faced with a turn that is not to our liking, but we sometimes think it ought 
to be controllable by macroeconomic policy. While the spectrum of policies could range from 
Keynesian “fine tuning” to using monetarist “rules,” every action (or inaction) of the government 
is a policy. Because of this it is important that government policymakers be guided by appropriate 
empirical models. Unfortunately, there is considerable variation in the large numbers of econometric 
models that have been developed thus far. Moreover, there are persistent problems, both technical 
and theoretical, with these models. 
In this paper we will show that the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is an effective method for 
forecasting the end effects of a given policy or set of policies, and determining the resulting impact 
on important variables such as unemployment and inflation. The forecasts could be made using 
the judgments of leading economists, congressmen and personnel from major federal agencies such 
as OMB, CEA, commerce, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. One side benefit would be a 
clearer understanding and appreciation of the problem under consideration as viewed from these 
different perspectives. The analysis in this paper reflects the economic climate of the early 1980s. 
2. A FEW WORDS ABOUT EXISTING ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
There are problems with currently existing econometric models. Some are purely technical in 
nature and arise from the statistical approach. For example, there is a need to determine the proper 
estimating technique for equations with lagged dependent variables and serially correlated error 
terms when embedded in a simultaneous system of equations. There has been steady progress in 
the development of these statistical models but their formalisms do not yield satisfactory solutions. 
Other problems with the current crop of econometric models are more serious. For instance, the 
presence of so many models, all differing significantly in their structure, raises the question of how 
to specify the type of model and the parameters. There is a yet more serious question common to 
virtually all econometric models that use time-series data to estimate historical correlations between 
variables. The estimated coefficients that represent peoples’, firms’ and governments’ behavior are 
typically presumed to be “structural” in nature-that is, they are assumed to be invariant with 
respect to changes in the economic environment and, in particular, to changes brought about by 
policy actions. But, instead of being constant, these coefficients are unstable and may account for 
“sudden, unpredictable shifts in behavioral relationships.. .” [ 11. Economists using these models 
have responded by developing statistical techniques that allow the estimated parameters to drift 
at random rather than forcing them to be constant [2,3]. This has resulted in forecasts of somewhat 
increased accuracy [4]. 
But allowing for random parameters in the estimation process is at best a statistical device for 
coping with a more basic problem. A fundamental observation is that on the part of consumers 
only the parameters of utility functions are truly invariant with respect to changes in policy, while 
for firms the same is true only for the parameters of their production functions. All “behavioral” 
coefficients in an individual’s demand and supply functions depend, in some fashion, on more 
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primitive parameters in his utility function and his perceived budget constraint. After all, demand 
functions are the result of the individual maximizing his utility subject to the restraint given by the 
perceived economic environment as embodied in his budget constraint. Any change in government 
policy alters the economic environment and leads to a change in the structure of the demand 
function as the individual responds to the changed incentives. The same general conclusions are 
true for firms’ (andindividuals’) supply functions. As a result, the assumptions made in most 
econometric models that the estimated coefficients of the demand and supply functions are stable 
with respect to changes in policy are hard to defend. Sargent [S] discusses in detail the econometric 
consequences of these observations (which originated with Lucas [6]) for standard econometric 
models. 
These considerations have two immediate implications. The first is that the “sudden, unpredictable 
shifts.. . in the coefficients” are no longer a puzzle. The instability is a manifestation of the fact that 
a forecasting model’s coefficients are not truly structural in nature and, because of this, shifts and 
changes are to be expected. The second, and more serious, weakness is that standard econometric 
models are particularly unable to forecast results of alternative policies because as different policies 
are instituted the parameters of the estimated demand and supply functions change due to people 
and firms altering their behavior. In virtually all econometric models, this effect is simply ignored 
because of technical difficulties. 
These defects of existing models have led to widely differing reactions among economists. 
Equilibrium theorists tend to regard the objections sympathetically while disequilibrium (Keynesian) 
economists tend to dismiss them as minor. Some, such as Sims [7], have been led to the conclusion 
that all existing macroeconomic models are misspecified and that economists can predict virtually 
nothing about the effects of different policies. Lucas [6] bluntly wrote, “features which lead to 
success in short term forecasting are unrelated to quantitative policy evaluation. . . . The macro- 
economic models are (well) designed to perform the former task only, and these models can, in 
principle, provide no useful information as to the actual consequences of alternative economic 
policies.” Others, such as Anderson [8], have attempted to manipulate existing models to avoid 
the problems mentioned above. Still others, mostly the designers, users and sellers of large 
econometric models have ignored these criticisms or else dismissed them as trivial. The AHP, 
however, enables us to take account of these points and to include effects of the policies being 
considered in our forecasts. 
First-stage problem 
We will consider the problem of finding the best macroeconomic policy package among a given 
set by considering the effect that each policy package has on national “welfare.” The effect of each 
package on national welfare is, in turn, decomposed into the effects of the package on key criteria, 
such as inflation, unemployment and growth. In terms of the AHP, this problem formulation leads 
to a three-level hierarchy. The goal of best policy for the national welfare is in the first level. The 
criteria occupy the second level and the policy packages occupy the third level. The hierarchy 
corresponding to this problem from which the relative effectiveness of the different policies on the 
third level are determined is illustrated later. 
Second-stage problem 
In the second stage we incorporate both the uncertainty concerning the exogenous forces 
operating on the economy and the possibility that the effectiveness of the various policies may 
change over time. Uncontrollable forces that affect the economy are included in the hierarchy in 
another level that involves what we call “exogenous scenarios” or SEs. These SEs consist of elements 
beyond the control of the policymaker that are deemed to exert an important effect upon the 
economy. Examples of such elements are drastic changes in the real price of energy, or wars 
involving vital interests of the nation. Since these scenarios are by their nature uncertain, a number 
of potential scenarios are constructed. Moreover, time is intimately involved whenever a scenario 
is constructed, and the expected SE may change with the passing of time. 
The hierarchy is a modification of that described above with a cycle between the projected 
scenarios and time appearing in level 2 and the rest of the hierarchy pushed down one level. Figure 
1 gives the modified hierarchy. The cycles between the scenarios and the time periods are designed 
to give us the relative likelihoods of occurrence of the various SEs in the given time periods and 
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also the relative importance of the time periods to the occurrence of the scenarios. 
Using the AHP the likelihood of the occurrence of a given scenario in different time periods is 
calculated and for any given time period, the likelihood of each scenario actually occurring is 
obtained. 
To find the priorities of both the time periods and the scenarios simultaneously a super matrix 
is constructed (see Saaty [9] for use of the supermatrix to solve cycling or feedback priority 
problems in the AHP). The two sets of eigenvectors which give the likelihood of the scenarios in 
each time period and the likelihood of occurrence of the scenarios across the time periods are used 
as the columns of two matrices. Each matrix occupies one of the two off-diagonal positions of a 
2 x 2 block super matrix which is column stochastic. The limiting power of the matrix yields the 
priorities of both the time periods and the scenarios. The priorities of the scenarios are used for 
subsequent weighting in the hierarchy. 
Given these likelihoods, the next step in the procedure is to apply the familiar process of ranking 
the effectiveness of the policies with respect to the criteria. The only difference from the usual AHP 
composition concerns time. For each time period and exogenous scenario combination under 
consideration, the rankings are obtained from questions of the form: “Given exogenous scenario 
SE, how much more effective is policy P enacted at time T, than policy P, also enacted at time T, 
in lowering the unemployment rate at time T?” For each particular time period and exogenous 
scenario combination, the contribution of each policy toward the nation’s welfare is computed 
precisely as before. For each particular time period, these welfare vectors are weighted by the 
likelihood of occurrence of the specific SE and the weighted vectors are summed to arrive at the 
overall expected relative contribution of the policies toward achieving the nation’s welfare. Since 
each of these summed vectors applies to time periods somewhere in the future, they are discounted 
to the present to arrive at the overall effectiveness of the policies. One selects the policy with the 
largest priority. 
Quantitative forecasts 
After the policies have been qualitatively ranked, the next step is to obtain the quantitative 
forecasts. We will illustrate our forecasting procedure by using only the first stage, short-run 
technique. 
The forecasting procedure introduces a second hierarchy, which extends the first hierarchy further 
down, and adds a new element “non-controllable actors”. Non-controllable actors are organizations, 
groups of individuals or institutions who wield substantial influence over certain sectors or variables 
but who are not under the direct control of the policymaker. The non-controllable actors will 
Objective: NATIONAL WELFARE 
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Fig. 1. Illustrative example of a second-stage problem. 
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occupy the second level in this hierarchy, immediately beneath each criterion. The level under the 
non-controllable actors will contain the range of actions they can take to influence the criteria. 
Immediately beneath this will be the level containing the quantitative effect each possible action 
could have on the criteria. 
An example of this type of hierarchy is given in Fig. 2 for the criterion of inflation. The second 
row contains suggested non-controllable actors who exert direct influence on the inflation rate. It 
would be possible to include other groups who can influence the inflation rates but the three given 
in the figure will suffice for the purpose of this illustration. The first step would be to construct a 
comparison matrix between the three non-controllable actors and to calculate the relative influence 
each exerts upon the inflation rate. 
The third level in Fig. 2 illustrates a range of possible actions consumers could take that would 
affect the inflation rate. There would be other analogous entries in this level for the other non- 
controllable actors. We have omitted them to simplify things. These five actions are grouped in a 
comparison matrix and ranked according to the question: “Given that whatever specific policy we 
are quantifying has been adopted, what is the likelihood that one of the actions (e.g. increase 
demand with moderate intensity, “moderately”) will occur relative to another action?’ The weights 
obtained from this matrix will represent the relative likelihoods that consumers will change their 
demand for goods by the given intensity. The last level in the hierarchy lists the range of possible 
inflation rates. Again, each entry in the “possible actions” level of the hierarchy will have associated 
with it a range of possible inflation rates. Again, for simplicity, we do not show all the detail. This 
level is prioritized in a comparison matrix by answering the question: “Given that the specific 
possible action has occurred (e.g. no change in demand), what is the likelihood that inflation will 
assume a certain value as compared to another ?” The weights obtained from this exercise will be 
the priorities that the inflation rate will be equal to the given amounts. 
The next step is to obtain the quantitative forecast. This is done by first weighting the possible 
Specific 
criterion: INFLATION RATE 
Non-control- 
I 
I I 1 
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I I 
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, I I I I I 1 I 
INCREASE INCREASE NO DEkREASE 
I 
DECREASE 
DEMAND DEMAND CHANGE DEMAND DEMAND 
DRAMATI- MODER- IN MODER- DRAMATI- 
CALLY ATELY DEMAND ATELY CALLY 
I 
I 
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Fig. 2. The extended hierarchy with non-controllable actors. 
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inflation rates by the priority of their occurrence for each possible action. These expected inflation 
rates are then weighted by the likelihood that the possible action to which they pertain takes place. 
For example, the expected inflation rate, given that there is no change in demand by consumers, 
might be 7%. This figure is, in turn, weighted by the priority that there is no change in demand 
by consumers. When this has been done for each of the possible actions by consumers, the (five) 
weighted figures are summed to arrive at the expected value of the “consumer’s contribution” to 
the inflation rate. This procedure is carried out for all other non-controllable actors being considered. 
The final step is to weight each non-controllable actor’s expected contribution by the relative 
importance of the actor to arrive at the overall expected inflation rate. This procedure is implemented 
for all the criteria to be forecast for all the specific policies being considered. 
There are several useful points to make about this approach. First, in other cases in which 
forecasting has actually been carried out, the results have proven to be accurate by other measures 
(see Zahedi [lo] for forecasting applications). In addition, when forecasting, each comparison 
matrix is conditioned upon which specific policy is being considered. The question used to rank 
the possible actions refers directly to the policy package for which the forecast is being made. It is 
at this stage that we allow the non-controllable actors to react differently according to whatever 
policy we are considering; thus we take into account the criticism of Lucas and others that the 
behavior of economic agents depends strongly upon the policies that are in force. Finally, the use 
of the AHP, combined with judgment-based comparisons eliminates the complaint levied against 
econometric models that the results of policy exercises are predetermined by the model’s basic 
structure. The AHP is sufficiently general so that it is possible to include a variety of non- 
controllable actors in an effort to capture effects neglected by specific models and modelers. 
Economists belonging to the monetarist school tend to dismiss the effect that organized labor has 
on the inflation rate. If it were a monetarist economist using the AHP to forecast the inflation rate, 
it would still be possible to include labor unions in the series of non-controllable actors-the 
monetarist would simply give it a small weight. 
3. APPLICATION OF THE AHP TO MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
We examine the problem of selecting the best macroeconomic policy package in a given set of 
policy packages by considering the effect that each policy package has on national “welfare.” In 
our exaniple, we assume that national welfare is affected by five key criteria: the inflation rate, the 
unemployment rate, the economic growth rate, the level of domestic stability and the state of 
foreign relations. The economic criteria have the usual meanings. Inflation pertains to a general 
increase in prices as measured by, for example, the GNP deflator; unemployment refers to the 
percentage of the labor force unemployed; and economic growth refers to increased per capita real 
GNP. In our example, we define the reduction in inflation to be a 4% reduction; the reduction in 
unemployment meant a 1% reduction; and the increase in growth referred to 0.5% increase. The 
last two (non-economic) criteria are not expressed quantitatively and could be defined at the start 
of the exercise to suit specific requirements. We also define domestic stability to include racial 
integration, political participation and business-labor-government relations. The criterion of 
foreign relations included relations with allies, the Third World, the oil-producing Middle East and 
the Soviet/Communist nations. 
There are two features to note in the list of criteria. First, the set is not exhaustive. It would be 
possible to add or delete criteria depending on the views of the user. The indeterminancy resulting 
from what must be a normative listing of criteria for the objective function is not specific to the 
AHP but is common to all methods of evaluating alternative policies. The second feature is that 
the inclusion of domestic stability and foreign relations in the list of criteria serves to demonstrate 
the flexibility of the AHP to combine unlike factors in the decision-making process. Though the 
above two criteria are not immediately economic, it seems clear that the level of national welfare 
is influenced by the state of foreign relations and domestic stability. To this extent, the scope of 
this model is potentially much broader than conventional ones. 
In the level below the criteria we have the policy packages. Thus this problem is a three-level 
hierarchy. The overall objective, national welfare, is at the top of the hierarchy. The criteria occupy 
the second level and the policy packages, to be evaluated for how they affect each criterion, are in 
the bottom level. 
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In our example, we took the vantage point of a “representative” person in society to provide 
judgments for the pairwise comparisons of the criteria with respect to their importance to national 
welfare. It should be emphasized once again that any attempt through any model to develop 
economic policy must specify implicitly or explicitly an objective function for that policy. And 
either way such an objective function will rely on value judgments. Thus, establishing the relative 
importance of the criteria in level 1 for a “representative” person in society amounts to specifying 
explicitly the objective function and the value judgments leading to it. The result is the vector of 
relative weights, or the relative importance of the criteria to national welfare, given in Table 1. 
Note that a reduction in the inflation rate is deemed the most important action to improve national 
welfare. A reduction in unemployment, while not as important as a reduction in the inflation rate, 
is still more important than the remaining criteria. The other criteria have very low priorities in 
comparison with inflation and unemployment. The values in this vector of relative weights can be 
interpreted either as the importance of one criterion over another, e.g. inflation is nine times 
(0.45/0.05) as important as foreign relations, or as the relative attention that should be paid a 
particular criterion (inflation = 45%) in attempting to improve national welfare. 
The next level of the hierarchy involves specifying policy packages and forecasting their effect 
upon each of the five criteria. Various new and traditional macropolicies were selected, 20 in all. 
For simplicity, the policies were clustered into three sets “A”, “ B” and “c”, corresponding to what 
is generally regarded as “conservative,” “ moderate” and “liberal”, respectively. 
The policy packages were evaluated with respect to the economic criteria (inflation, unemployment 
and growth), three times-from the vantage point of a monetarist, from that of a Keynesian and, 
finally, from a “supply-side” viewpoint. For the criteria of domestic relations and foreign relations 
we evaluated the impact of the policy packages from the point of view of a “representative” 
individual again; it was not necessary to distinguish between monetarist, Keynesian and supply- 
side opinions. We then selected the optimal policy from each set (A, B and C) for each economic 
viewpoint, combined the optimal policies into a single set and selected the best overall policy for 
each school. 
The policies were evaluated only for their presumed short-run effect on the five criteria. And we 
took into consideration the constraint that the government!s budget places on the use of various 
policy tools. For example, if the government lowers tax rates by 10% while leaving its total 
spending unchanged, there would be a potential shortfall of revenue. If this were the case, either 
bonds and/or money would have to be issued to finance the tax cut and to reconcile expenditures 
with revenues. Thus, in the following development, we specified complete policies (e.g. “lower tax 
rates by 10% and issue money to cover any shortfall”). 
The notation and symbols used to describe the policies are given in Table 2. In Table 3, the 
evaluation of cluster B policies with respect to inflation from the monetarist viewpoint, we give an 
example of how we evaluated cluster policies through pairwise comparisons with respect to a 
criterion. Similar comparisons were carried out for every economic group and every cluster. The 
judgments were given in response to the following type of question: “From a monetarist viewpoint, 
how much more effective in reducing the inflation rate will a policy of decreasing tax rates by 10% 
while balancing the budget using money and bonds (i.e. Txv, B, Mf 10%) be than a policy of 
cutting tax rates by 5% and issuing money and bonds to make up any revenue shortfall (i.e. Txv, 
B, Mf 5%)?” In this case, where the policies are ranked from a monetarist perspective, we judged 
the second policy to be between strongly and very strongly more effective (i.e. 6) than the first 
policy. Since the comparison is, by convention, between the Jirst policy relative to the second policy, 
we placed the ranking (l/6) in the matrix. The remaining comparisons in this matrix were entered 
in a similar fashion. The extreme right column gives the vector of relative weights for these four 
policies to achieve a reduction in inflation. 
Table 1. Contribution of the criteria to the overall objective (national welfare) 
National welfare I u G D F Weights 
Inflation (I) 1 3 5 4 6 0.45 
Unemployment (U) l/3 1 4 4 6 0.30 
Growth (G) l/5 l/4 1 2 2 0.11 
Domestic stability (D) l/4 l/4 l/2 I 2 0.09 
Foreian relations (F) 116 116 112 l/2 I 0.05 
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Table 2. Svmbols for the descriotion of “olicies 
G Government spending 
B Issuance of bonds 
M Issuance of money 
TX Total tax rates (corporate and personal) 
TC Corporate tax rates 
Gm Military spending 
Gtr Transfer payments 
t Increase 
1 Decrease 
Exam”les of the notation: (I) TxlB. MT imulies a 
decrease’in tax rates of 10% with a”; revenw siortfall 
made up by increasing, in the same proportion as they 
stood before the tax cut. the amount of bonds and money 
issued; (2) GtrT (10%) = Gml implies a 10% increase in 
total transfer payments that is offset by a” equal dechne 
in government spending on defense. 
In general, the given percentage change applies to the 
first ttem in the policy list. The only exception to this is 
the policy package denoted by G, TX, Ml, where the 
percentage decrease applies to the first two entries in the 
string and the change I” M is the balancing residual. 
Table 3 Evaluation of cluster B pohcies with respect to inflatton (monetartst 
wewpoint) 
Inflation 10% 5% 10% 5% Relatwe 
0.45 Txl. B, MT Txl, B, MT G, Tel G, Tci weights 
Txl. B. MT 10% I l/6 l/7 115 0.044 
Txl. B. MT 5% 6 I l/7 115 0.115 
Tc, G1 10% 7 7 I 3 0.56 
Tc, GJ 5% 5 5 l/3 1 0.281 
Once the policy matrices are prioritized with respect to each of the five criteria, the overall 
efficacy of each policy is determined by multiplying the effectiveness of each policy with respect to 
a given criterion by the weight of the criterion toward affecting national welfare, and then adding 
over all the criteria. 
An example of this procedure is given in Table 4. In this table we calculated the overall 
effectiveness of the policy G, TX, Mf 10% when judged from a monetarist viewpoint. Column (2) 
gives the weights of the criteria we developed in Table 1. Column (3) shows how effective this 
particular policy is in satisfying the various criteria. The fourth column weights the effectiveness 
of the policy. These weighted contributions are summed and the overall effectiveness of the policy 
is given in the bottom row of the table. Tables 5-7, which give the overall effectiveness of the 
policies in each cluster, also contain a summary of the efficacy of each policy with respect to the 
criteria. In order not to clutter our work with a mass of detail, we have not reported the comparison 
matrices between the various policies with respect to their effect upon the specific criteria. Instead, 
we simply report the results of these comparisons in the bottom portion of Tables 5-7. The 
comparisons underlying these results will not be given here. 
Now we have an initial sorting of the 20 policies. The next step is to select the most effective 
policies from each cluster and then rank them directly against each other to find the overall best 
Table 4. Determination of the overall efTectiveness of the policy G, TX, 
Ml 10% (monetarist viawoint) 
Criterion 
(I) 
Inflation 
Unemployment 
Growth 
Domestic stability 
Foreign relations 
Weight 
of the 
criterion 
(2) 
0.450 
0.300 
0.110 
0.090 
0.050 
E&ctiveness 
of the policy Contribution 
with respect to the 
to the overall 
criterion objective 
(3) (4) = (3) x (2) 
0.120 0.05 
0.103 0.03 
0.306 0.03 
0.240 0.02 
0.099 0.01 
Overall etTectiveness 0.14 
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policy. The technique of clustering the policies into three groups, calculating the rankings within 
the groups and then calculating the rankings between the most effective policies within the groups 
might appear to involve more work than directly comparing ail 20 potential policies simultaneously. 
This is, however, not the case as a simple calculation will show. Each comparison matrix involves 
M(M - 1)/2 judgments for the pairwise comparisons, where M is the number of elements being 
compared. Our clustering method of evaluating policies required a total of 360 comparisons for 
each viewpoint. Directly comparing all the policies would have required 500 comparisons. Thus, 
the clustering technique requires only 72% of the comparison needed by the direct method. 
Professor Harker of the Wharton School has a procedure for making an even smaller number of 
comparisons [l 1, this issue, pp. 35333601. 
For each school of thought we selected the two best policies from cluster A and cluster C and 
the single best policy from cluster B. We then used the AHP methodology to rank these policies 
to arrive at the “optimal” policy. Tables 8-10 contain the results of this procedure for policies 
favored by monetarists, Keynesians and supply-siders, respectively. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Monetarists consider a policy to reduce the growth rate of the money supply by 6% matched 
by a decrease in government spending to be optimal. Keynesians find a policy of increasing 
government spending by 10% while financing the deficit by issuing bonds and money to be the 
best policy. Supply-side economists favor a policy to reduce government spending and tax rates 
by 10% and would allow change in the money supply to be a balancing factor in the government’s 
Tables 8a, b. Effectiveness of monetarist policies 
Table Sa. Overall effecttveness of monetarist 
policies 
Pohcy Overall effectiveness 
M, Gl 6% 0.33 
M. Gl 3% 0.18 
T,. Cl 10% 0.17 
G. B, MT 10% 0.18 
G,,f = G, 5% 0.14 
Table Sb. Effectiveness of monetarist policies with respect to the specific criteria 
Inflation Unemployment Growth Domestic Foreign 
Policy (0.45) (0.30) (0.11) (0.W relations (0.05) 
M. GJ 6% 0.596 0.063 0.230 0.075 0.212 
M. G1 3% 0.240 0.136 0.147 0.049 0.153 
T,, G1 10% 0.113 0.159 0.503 0.184 0.06 1 
G. B, M’I 10% 0.026 0.411 0.061 0.116 0.543 
C&t = G,l 5% 0.026 0.23 1 0.059 0.576 0.030 
Tables 9a, b. Effectiveness of Keynesian policies 
Table 9a. Overall effectiveness of Keynesian 
pohcies 
Policy Overall etTectiveness 
GmT = G,.i 10% 0.19 
Gmt = G,,l 5% 0.11 
T,, G1 10% 0.22 
G, B, MT 10% 0.26 
G. TX, B, MT 10% 0.20 
Table 9b. Effectiveness of Keynesian policies with respect to the specific criteria 
Inflation Unemployment Growth Domestic Foreign 
Policy 
GMT = CT.1 10% 
(0.45) (0.30) (0.11) (0.09) relations(0.05) 
0.278 0.068 0.086 0.100 0.472 
Gmt = G& 5% 0.143 0.093 0.102 0.223 0.259 
T,, GJ 10% 0.433 0.037 0.046 0.107 0.040 
G, B, Ml 10% 0.057 0.522 0.317 0.365 0.114 
G, TX, B, MT 10% 0.089 0.280 0.449 0.203 0.114 
230 T. L. SAATV 
Tables lOa, b. Electiveness of supply-side policies 
Table 1Oa Overall etTectiveness of supply- 
side policm 
Policy Overall effectiveness 
G. TX. Ml. 10% 0.49 
6, TX, Ml 5% 0.19 
TxJ. B, MT 10% 0.19 
G,,T = Gml 10% 0.06 
G,,‘I = C,l 5% 0.06 
Table lob. Effectiveness of supply-side pohaes wrth respect o Ihe specific criteria 
Inflation Unemployment Growth Domestx Foreign 
Poky (0.45) (0.30) (0.11) (0.09) Relations (0.05) 
G, TX, Ml 10% 0.562 0.536 0.567 0.116 0.161 
G. TX, Ml 5% 0.232 0.157 0 156 0.121 0.261 
Txl. B, MT 10% 0.126 0.239 0.211 0.193 0.433 
Gra. = Gml 10% 0.029 0.040 0.030 0.346 0.048 
G,,T = <;,I 5% 0.05 I 0.028 0.037 0.224 0.097 
budget constraint. 
It is interesting to see what we can observe about this analysis from the hindsight of our early 
1987 perspective. Probably the best we can say is that a mixed set of policies prevailed. There was 
a supply-sider in the White House (Ronald Reagan) and something of a monetarist (Paul Volcker) 
holding the reins at the Federal Reserve. Taxes were decreased; inflation has moderated significantly; 
growth in the economy has been modest but steady since late 1982. However, it has not been 
possible to restrain government spending, thought by both monetarists and supply-siders in 1981 
to be a very desirable end to achieve. This was the result primarily of an impasse between Congress 
and the Administration as to where to make the cuts-defense or social programs. (The recently 
enacted Gramm-Rudman legislation seeks to address this problem by annual across-the-board 
cuts if agreement is not forthcoming.) There has accordingly been a tremendous rise in the budget 
deficit and in the trade deficit; unemployment, though still high relative to the earlier post-war 
period, has been brought under control; interest rates are down significantly; the stock market has 
more than doubled from a Dow Jones Index of less than 1000 to over 2000. Whether this signifies 
a healthy economy remains to be seen and is probably dependent on one’s point of view. The 
average U.S. citizen may consider himself to be better off than he was in 1981, but to those outside 
the U.S., we are living on borrowed money-to finance our trade and budget deficits. 
In any event we have now shown how the AHP can be applied to the problem of selecting an 
optimal macroeconomic policy and estimating its impact. This approach to forecasting has some 
advantages over more conventional methods. For instance, it makes it possible to incorporate ideas 
or theories into forecasts that are difficult to include in quantitative econometric models. In 
addition, since the AHP procedure is essentially “structure-free”, it eliminates the criticism that the 
results obtained from its use are predetermined by its a priori specification. Our brief analysis 
shows that the optimal choices of the various schools can be predicted by this process. The AHP 
also shows how strongly each ranks alternative policies relative to their primary preferences. 
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